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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
JOHN WILLIAM INGRAM, 
Deceased 
Case 
No. 8542 
Respondents' Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as set forth in the appellants' brief are sub-
stantially correct as far as the statement goes, but some 
additions to the statement are made by respondent to 
give the Court the view of respondents. 
For many years before and after 1940 John William 
Ingram, also known as J. W. Ingram, and Uncle Will, 
lived near his brother, M. Smith Ingram, in Nephi, Utah. 
He visited frequently with Smith Ingram and Smith's 
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family, including the five children, Manila, Blain, Earl, 
Bonnie and Kenneth; and all of whom were nice to him 
and cared for and assisted him. He had been married 
in 1938, but only for less than a month. 
In May 1940, J. W. Ingram wrote a letter to his 
niece, ~ianila Ingram Brock, named above, which has 
been offered herein as Exhibit 1 and admitted to probate 
by the trial court as the Olographic will of decedent, who 
hereafter will be referred to as testator. By said will 
whatever of his property was left was to be divided 
equally between the above-named nieces and nephews. 
The brother and sisters of the testator, other than 
~I. S. Ingram, had not visited with him; there had been 
trouble, one not speaking, although living near. The other 
brother and sisters are the objectors and appellants 
herein who are endeavoring to obtain whatever property 
J. W. Ingram left. 
Eight days after said letter, testator executed deeds 
to his real estate, reserving a life estate therein, and bill 
of sale covering personal property, to :Manila and her 
brother Blain. Thereafter other action was taken to 
transfer other pro pert~· to ~lanila and Blain. 
The rpcords herein show that Attorney P. N. Ander-
:-;on assisted testator in the transfers of his poperty; that 
he wa::; the attonwy who initiated this proceeding; and 
that he passed away in the early stages hereof. 
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THE EVIDENCE 
The witness Paul E. Booth, manager of the Commer-
cial Bank, Nephi office, testified that he had a conversa-
tion with John William Ingram, the testator, in which 
Ingram said ''he was getting oid and his health was get-
ting bad, he wanted to fix his accounts, wanted to leave his 
accounts to his niece, Manila I. Brock." (Tr. 25) At first 
he said the conversation was about 1940 or 1941, and on 
re-checking testified that the conversation was on or 
about January 16,1947, when a signature card was signed 
in the bank. ( Tr. 44) He further testified that there was 
a bank ledger sheet in the names "J. W. Ingram or Ma-
nila Brock''; that the account was opened December 9, 
1939, and the last entry was on June 25, 1940; that the 
two names appeared to have been typed on two different 
typewriters. (Tr. 51) 
With regard to a sale of property that was made in 
about 1952 and the contract therefor placed in the bank 
for collection, Mr. Booth testified that the testator said 
he wanted the proceeds of the sale to go to Violet I. Brock. 
Violet I. Brock is the same as Violet Manila Ingram. 
(Tr. 26) 
Mrs. Leora Belliston testified that she and her family 
rented part of the home of John William Ingram from 
1936 until May of 1941. She testified that she witnessed 
the signing of the Nephi Irrigation Company Water Cer-
tificates, Exhibits 4 and 5, on May 28, 1940. (Transcript 
34, 35) She said that "He had been quite sick a while be-
3 
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fore that, that same winter he had been awfully sick with 
the flu, and he was feeling a little bit better when he had 
these papers made out.'' (Tr. 35, 36) She said that J. W. 
Ingram ''said he was getting all the water stock fixed up 
so there wouldn't no no trouble about it"; (Tr. 36) That 
several times right around the same period of time, she 
had conversations with Mr. Ingram regarding his prop-
erty in which the subject of the disposition of his prop-
erty was discussed. (Tr. 36, 37) That "he said he was 
having it all fixed up, he was going to get his deeds fixed 
in Smith's kid's names and that he had them recorded." 
(Tr. 37) That at different times he mentioned all of the 
names of Smith Ingram's children, ~ianila, Donna, Earl, 
Blaine, and Kenneth. He further told her ''he was having 
it fixed for his (Smith's) kids, having it fixed up so no-
body else could touch it." (Tr. 38) Mrs. Belliston related 
that the testator had told her they had some trouble one 
time and so he changed the name of Blanche on a life in-
surance policy, that the policy had been on (in) Nila and 
Blanche; that Blanche was a niece of testator, the daugh-
ter of one of the ojectors and appellants herein. (Tr. 
37-9) As to the actions of Smith's children toward John 
W. Ingram during that period, Mrs. Belliston testified, 
''Yes, they treated him nice. When he was sick, they 
would come there and get him and see if he needed 
anything." "They came many times to his home"; that 
:\[r. and ~ln;;. Smith Ingram came to the home and would 
bring tT. \V. Ingram something to eat and fix for him, 
bringing laundry, ironing, clothes, canned and bottled 
fruit (Tr. 41); that shl· did not recall of observing any-
one other than Smith Ingram and his wife and children 
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visiting with John William Ingram. (Tr. 41) With re-
spect to statements made by Mr. Ingram as to what was 
and what was not to be done with his property, Mrs. Bel-
liston testified, "Well, he told me that he had his all 
made out to Smith's kids and had his deeds recorded." 
(Tr. 44) 
Mrs. Louise Ingram, sister-in-law of John William 
Ingram and mother of the proponents, testified that dur-
ing the spring of 1940 Will Ingram had a sick spell, flu, 
and that during that period her children were frequent 
visitors to his home; that she and the children adminis-
tered to his needs and wants during the year and prior 
thereto. (Tr. 64) That during that time J. W. Ingram 
called at her home and told her and her husband "he 
hadn't been feeling well, and he had fixed up his property, 
he had made his deeds out and fixed his will'' ( Tr 65) ; that 
he had written to Mrs. Ingram's daughter Manila at 
Green River and explained everything to her and what 
she should do; that he had everything fixed up the way 
he wanted it to go, and that there wouldn't be any trouble 
or anything else to follow; that he had everything fixed, 
and that he had left it to my (Mrs. Smith Ingram's) chil-
dren (Tr. 66). She testified further that he used to say 
quite a few times that he had it all fixed up so that no 
one else could get it, because he wanted it to go to them, 
my children. (Tr. 67) She related that "one time he 
came out and we were talking about flowers, and he said 
his sister Olive had a plant that she would like- that he 
would like, and I said, 'Why don't you go get it, go ask 
for it.' And he said 'Oh, I haven't spoken to her for 
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eleven years' ''; that that sister lived about a block from 
him (Tr. 67) 
Violet Manila Ingram Brock identified the three doc-
uments, Exhibits 1, 2 and 6, as being written wholly in 
the handwriting of John William Ingram, and that the 
same were dated and signed by him and were received 
by her from him. That she received letters quite often 
from her uncle, John William Ingram. (Tr. 70, 72, 73, 74) 
Bonnie Ingram Holm, a niece and proponent herein, 
related, as set forth, that as she came back into Uncle 
Will's hospital ward, he was handing Nila some papers, 
and said ''Now, these are for you and Blain. Take care of 
them." (Tr. 90) She also said that "we grew up with the 
idea that what he had would be ours, and he always told 
us it was up to Nila and Blain to do it, to-"; (Tr. 91) that 
those papers and the other property of Uncle Will's were 
to be kept for distribution to all of the children in a fair 
manner. (Tr. 92) 
.Appellant states as a fact that "all of the brothers 
and sisters of the testator except said M. S. Ingram 
oppose the admission of the documents to probate as a 
will and oppose the appointment of M. S. Ingram as ad-
ministrator with will annxed." (Tr. 1-2) The record 
shows on examination of appellant and cross-petitioner, 
i\1 rs. :Maggie Coulson: 
Q. Have you been requested by all of your brothers and 
sisters save and except Smith Ingram to petition for 
the position as administratrix of this estate 1 
6 
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A~ No I haven't. 
Q. Haven't they asked you~ 
A. No. 
Q. Your brother Hugh did, didn't he~ 
A. Yes, and you did (Mr. Tanner). 
Q. Did the other two make any expression directly to 
you~ 
A. No. 
Q. Have they made an expression of dissatisfaction with 
your brother Smith~ 
A. I haven't heard of any because I haven't been 
around. 
Q. You haven't talked with them. 
A. I haven't. (Tr. 107-8) 
The appellant (or appellants) did not challenge the 
fitness of M. S. Ingram to be and act as administrator. 
The objection was he would not try to take certain money 
and property away from his children which Will Ingram 
gave to them. 
Concerning her own view about the estate of Will 
Ingram, or recovering property for the estate, she testi-
fied (Tr. 102, 103) : 
7 
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Q. You want to be appointed administratrix of the es-
tate of Will Ingram for the purpose of suing someone 
for some property1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't 1 You don't want to sue anyone for any 
property1 
~\. No, sir, I don't. 
(~. Is it your brother that wants to sue~ 
....-\.. I don't have any knowledge of that. 
Q. Is it your nieces or nephews who want to sue? 
.A. I have no knowledge of that. 
Q. But you don't have any knowledge of any property 
in your brother Will's estate, do you? 
A. No. 
Q. So far as you know there isn't any. 
~\. Well, I know he had some. 
Q. That was years ago? 
A. rrhat "·as about thirty years ago, before I left Nephi. 
Q. And you haven't been acquainted with any assets or 
any property since that time? 
8 
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A. No. 
Q. And so that you haven't made any investigation of 
your own to determine what if any assets there are of 
this estate' 
A. No. (Tr 102-3) 
THE FINDINGS 
From all of the evidence the court found, among 
other things, as appears from the Order Admitting Will 
to Probate and Appointing Administrator with the Will 
Annexed: 
1. That the documents filed herein, respectively 
dated May 21, 1940 (Exhibit 1) and November 28, 1944 
(Exhibit 6) were entirely written, dated and signed by 
said John William Ingram. (Findings 1 and 8; Tr. 
7, 21, 22) 
2. That at the time of writing and signing said doc-
uments, the said John William Ingram intended thereby 
to direct disposition of his property or some portions 
thereof after his death. (Findings 2, 9, 12) 
3. The court also found that the decedent had testa-
mentary capacity, and there was no revocation of the 
testamentary dispositions. (Findings 3, 10) 
ARGUMENT 
The points raised by appellants are of such nature 
that comments about particular points will be pertinent 
to the other points as well. 
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Respondents agree with the appellants that on or 
about :.May 28, 1940, testator executed and delivered war-
ranty deeds to two of the respondents, of all of his real 
property. We differ with appellants that there were sub-
stantial bank accounts and receivables left by testator as 
part of his estate. The findings of the court do not sus-
tain appellants' contention. 
On May 21, 1940, the testator wrote a letter in his 
own handwriting, dated, and signed by him, advising that 
he was fixing up his poperty in the only way it will stand; 
that he was '' 'deading' it to you (his niece) but reserve 
the right to control it 'til I die but iff I half to sell part 
of it to live on you would half to sign the deeds which I 
hope you will be willing to do. And what ever is left I 
want you to divide equilly with Earl-Bonie and Kennie 
and Blain and your self this way none of the other can do 
any thing iff I left the deads not recorded till I die then 
they could stop you from recording them and come for 
their share and besides Alice has come back. And if she is 
here when I go giYe her enought money to take her back 
are go where she pleases. I am sending the deads to you 
then you can send them back to the recorder and have 
them recorded. then send them back to me and I will put 
them in a safety box in at the bank in your and my name 
with other property and things of value I wish that I 
could talk to you. * * * '' 
Later a sale of the ranch was made with approval of 
said niece and a sale of part of the property in Nephi, 
Utah, with approval of Blain Ingram. (Tr. 26, 43) The 
10 
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testator used money therefrom during the rest of his life 
for his needs. It is the residue of these funds, the appel-
lants seek to have declared a part of testator's estate; and 
to use known assets of the estate to acquire the same. 
We agree with the appellants that the deeds to said 
niece and the nephew, Blain Ingram, were executed, de-
livered and recorded on or shortly following May 28, 
1940. (App. Brief 17, 27) 
POINT I 
THE PROPONENTS SUSTAINED THEIR 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 
In Point I appellants claim that the proponents have 
failed to sustain some special burden of proof and over-
come some presumption, and then ci'ted 54 A.L.R., 932 in 
support of the claims made, in the case of informal in-
struments, such as a letter, not purporting on its face to 
be a will. It was then stated as being the rule in Califor-
nia and other states. 
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the 
California Supreme Court did not allow any such rule 
or requirement to prevent a holding that a 24-word sen-
tence ont of a 700-word letter constituted a testamentary 
disposition. The sentence was as follows: "You can have 
the house on 25th Ave. and all the things of value so you 
won't be out any money on buying me." The Court also 
held that the fact the word ""·ill" was not mentioned in 
the letter did not disprove writer's intention to make tes-
tamentary disposition. In re Button's Estate, 1930, Cali-
fornia, 287 Pac. 964. 
11 
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The able trial judge who sat in this case participated 
in the recent Utah Supreme Court case, In re Swan's Es-
tate, 4 U. 2d 277, 293, P. 2d 682. In that case this Court 
stated, page 684: 
''A will contest being an action at law, we are 
bound by the trial court's findings unless such 
findings are unreasonable in view of all of the 
evidence and all reasonable inference therefrom 
when considered in the light most favorable to 
supporting the judgment.'' 
Such case (Swan) fully treats the questions of presump. 
tions. We submit that the trial court had that decision in 
mind and correctly applied the rules of law to the evi-
dence in this case. 
In passing, it is interesting to note that in this case 
there was evidence that testator considered that he had 
made a "will." (Tr. 65) Further, the evidence is abun-
dant that testator intended to make ultimate disposition 
of his property upon death, that he was thinking of the 
final disposition and distribution of his property upon 
death, and that such matter was in his mind at the time 
of writing the letter, Exhibit 1. 
POINTS II, III AXD IY. 
POTXTS II AXD II- THE EYIDEXCE 
SUSTAIN"ED THE FIXDlXGS OF TESTA-
1\t!ENTARY INTENT "\YITH RESPECT TO 
EXHIBITS 1 AND 6. 
POINT IV - LETTER OF NOVEMBER 
28, 1954, VIEWED WITH SURROUNDING 
12 
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FACTS AND CIRCUJ\!ISTANCES IS CAP-
ABLE OF BEING ADMINISTERED AS A 
CODICIL TO A WILL. 
That all of the formal requirements of the statute 
with regard to olographic wills were complied with has 
not been questioned by appellants. No contention was 
ever made that the testator did not intend that the four 
children, the proponents herein, should receive the whole 
of testator's property upon his passing. This Court, in 
view of the findings of the trial court, which findings are 
amply supported by the evidence, is not going to permit 
the amply proven intention of testator to be thwarted by 
the very people who were intended to be deprived of all 
benefit from testator's estate, in violation of the express 
and clear intention of testator. 
That the testator took action in two different ways 
and at two different times to accomplish his purpose, 
such action not being inconsistent and being pursuant to 
and consistent with common and good legal practice, 
should only serve to fortify and aid the Court in accom-
plishing testator's intentions. As this Court said in 
Johnson's Estate, 1924, 65 Utah 114, 228 Pac. 748, at 
page 749, 
"The intention of the testator is the ultimate ob-
ject to be kept in mind and to which all rules must 
yield." (In re Poppleton's Est. 34 U. 285, 97 P. 
138) and is the polar star which should guide the 
court in its decision. (In re Campbell 27 U. 361, 
75 Pac. 851; Rumel v. Solomon, 54 U. 25, 180 Pac. 
419.) 
13 
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In Murphy's Estate, 71 Pac. (2d) 6, the Washington 
Supreme Court said at page 11 : 
"The fact that an instrument of doubtful charac-
ter is invalid if regarded as a conveyance, while 
valid if regarded as a will, has been referred to 
as a ground for regarding it as a will, and con-
versely, the fact that an instrument is invalid if 
regarded as a will has been considered a ground 
for regarding it as a conveyance. This view is 
based partly upon the policy of the courts to give 
to an instrument a legal operation wherever pos-
sible and partly upon the consideration that the 
maker of the instrument must have intended it to 
operate in the mode in which he rendered it cap-
able of operating. 2 Tiffany Real Property (2nd 
Ed.) 1813, 4. Key 467 ; Read on Wills ( 2d Ed) 
69 (Key) 75." 
Appellant seems to emphasize that all of testator's 
property was disposed of by gifts inter vivos in order to 
avoid probate. It was most reasonable for testator, on 
May 21, 1940, to provide by will for the disposition of his 
property and shortly thereafter to make conveyances to 
save expenses of probate. Testator told Mrs. Louise In-
gram that he had made a will (Tr. 65), and the fact that 
he later executed deeds did not change the nature of the 
instrument he considered to be a will. Delivery of a will 
is not a prerequisite to its validity. 
It is significant at this point also to observe that in 
the letter, Exhibit 1, the last part, it is provided: 
'' ,, • • I am sending the deeds to you then you can 
send them back to me and I will put them in a 
safety box in at the bank in your and my name 
14 
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with other property and things of value 
(Italics supplied) 
* * * " 
It is apparent that the letter was to apply to more 
than just the deeds. The evidence is abundant that it was 
the intention of John William Ingram that his nieces and 
nephews, the proponents herein, should receive all of his 
property. Such intention was disclosed to the children 
themselves, to their parents, to his friends and associates; 
and in no instance was there a scintilla of evidence to 
show a contrary intent. By whatever means that intent 
was to be accomplished, it is clear that testator consid-
ered it to have been done. 
It is submitted that the writing of an olographic will, 
as in this case, was an adequate means, and that such in-
tention was accomplished in fact and law. 
The respectable authority cited by appellants, page 
23, Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, contains a provision 
so pertinent to the facts of this case as to be worthy of 
repetition, ''Section 46. Intention to Make Will - Use 
of the Word 'Will' '': 
''Animus testandi does not necessarily mean 
that the word 'will' or 'testament' must be used in 
the transaction. A man may make his will animo 
testandi, though he is so ignorant of law that he 
thinks it is called a deed or contract; or though he 
does not know what to call it. The test is not what 
he thinks is the legal name of the instrument 
which he is executing, but what its legal effect is 
in view of its nature, and of the real intention of 
the maker as deduced from the instrument and 
from all facts and circumstances. The fact that 
15 
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the testamentary provisions form a very small 
part of the entire document, the bulk of which is 
not intended to operate as a will, does not make 
such small part of the instrument inoperative as a 
will. 
* * * * 
' 'The animus testandi, then, does not turn on 
the presence or absence of the words 'will' or 'tes-
tament,' but on the intention of the testator as 
shown by the nature of the instrument and the 
surrounding facts and circumstances." (Italics 
supplied.) 
The surrounding facts and circumstances and the 
evidence thereof, in this case are clear beyond dispute or 
question that it was the intention of the testator that the 
proponents, those nieces and nephews named in the letter 
of May 21, 1940, Exhibit 1, were intended by testator to 
receive all of his property, and that none of it was to "go 
to the sisters and brothers and they never done me any 
good.'' He had not even spoken to one of the sisters for 
over eleven years, and she lived just a block away. ( Tr. 
67) And the witness who lived in part of testator's house, 
in whom he confided and who was chosen by testator as a 
witness to his signature on the water stock certificates 
(Exhibits 8 and 9), and which witness was unprejudiced, 
had nothing to gain in the premises - such witness testi-
fied that she did not recall observing anyone other than 
Smith Ingram and his wife and children visiting with 
John \Yilliam Ingram. (Tr. 41) 
It is obvious from the express findings made by the 
Trial Judge that the evidence presented by proponents 
was believed. It is clear, further, that all of the technical 
16 
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requirements were met in the two instruments, Exhibits 
1 and 6, to constitute them as the last will and testament 
of testator and a codicil thereto. The evidence and cir-
cumstances are sufficiently clear to enable the court to 
determine the wishes of testator with respect to Exhibit 
6, the codicil, without conjecture. As is said in Jones 
on Evidence, Civil Cases, Fourth Edition, Volume 2, Sec. 
475, page 907, 
''The court puts itself in the place of the per-
son who executed the writing, in so far as that is 
possible, for the purpose of construing the will 
and determining the meaning of the words. Evi-
dence of the surrounding facts may be shown on 
the issue as to due execution. 
"While proof of the circumstances, situation 
and surroundings of the testator and of his prop-
erty is admissible in order to place the court in the 
situation of the testator and thus to enable the 
court to understand the meaning and application 
of his language . . . '' 
There was not introduced by appellants, objectors, 
herein one scintilla of evidence which was inconsistent 
with the intentions expressed in the writing itself and 
with the intentions expressed by testator to others. 
The codicil to any will may be construed in connec-
tion with the will itself, and with the surrounding circum-
stances. By so doing, and which the Trial Court did, the 
objection raised by appellant in Point IV is obviated. It 
is unnecessary to point out that such Point IV attempts 
to treat the codicil as the will itself. 
17 
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Referring again to Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, 
in Section 54, at page 122, there are some pertinent pro-
visions: 
''A will is not to be declared void for uncer-
tainty if the intention of the testator can be deter-
mined from the will as interpreted by admissible 
evidence of the relations of parties and of the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances. 
''A rough memorandum which discloses testa-
mentary intent is good, though extrinsic evidence 
may be necessary to identify the beneficiaries and 
the subject-matter." 
And at page 142, sentence 6: 
''If the instrument, on its face, shows that it 
was drawn by an inexperienced or illiterate lay-
man, it will be construed all the more liberally 
than if it had been drawn by an expert.'' 
Reference in appellants' brief to "public policy for 
the avoidance of fraud" is considered to be uncalled for 
and directs attention to the testimony of the representa-
tive of the objectors, appellants herein (Transcript 100 
to 108), and to the a·bundance of evidence as to the clear 
intention and desires of testator which would be thwarted 
by reversing the decision of the trial court herein. 
When the testator wrote ''Dear N nese'' and handed 
the writing to Manila Brock and said "these papers are 
yours and Blains-take care of them,' ' it certainly was a 
designation of the person to whom it was addressed. As 
a codicil to the first letter it is made definite and certain 
the persons to whom he referred by ''Divide * * • these 
equil." 
18 
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The oral evidence adduced of all the witnesses is 
clear as to whom the testator designated as his benefic-
iaries. Such an application is made of similar facts 1n 
54 A.L.R. at page 919. 
We are unable to see that the Utah case of Jensen's 
Estate, 37 U. 428, 108 P. 927, referred to in the appel-
lant's brief has any persuasive authority to this case. 
No attack as such is made by the appellants upon the 
findings of the court, that they are not supported by the 
evidence; although recitation of some of the facts are 
made therein from which it appears it might have been so 
contended. We submit that all of the surrounding cir-
cumstances are proper as part of the consideration by 
the court to make its findings; and being amply supported 
by the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, 
the findings must stand. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is submitted that the appeal should be denied and 
dismissed; the Order Admitting Will to Probate and Ap-
pointing Administrator with the Will Annexed is sup-
ported by the fiindings, the evidence and reasonable 
inferences therefrom, and should be affirmed, with costs 
to respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EKS AYN ANDERSON 
711 X ewhouse Building, 
UDELL R. JENSEN 
Nephi, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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